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TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL CONVERSATIONS ABOUT 
SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
CEPS Special Report/March 2009 
AUDREY MACKLIN
* 
1. Introduction 
Human rights jurisprudence in the post 9/11 era provides a handy frequency for tuning into 
transjurisdictional conversations between national and supranational courts. The stark 
challenges to the rule of law posed by counter-terrorism initiatives have dislodged North 
American, European, Australian and New Zealand judges from the more comfortable task of 
refining existing rights protection regimes within their respective constitutional frameworks. 
Issues that would have scarcely been debatable two decades ago – including freedom from 
torture, secret trials, and indefinite detention – have moved from the margins to the centre of 
legal debate. The role of the judiciary as conscience and constraint on the exercise of power by 
democratically elected officials has simultaneously grown more salient and more controversial.  
Given this shifting legal landscape, many courts look to the dicta of other courts and to the 
practices of other states to draw inspiration, guidance, and both positive and negative examples. 
References by one court to another jurisdiction may relate to the interpretation of analogous 
constitutional provisions, the approach by another court to an international legal norm binding 
in both states, or an alternative legislative model that responds to a government’s legal claim 
that no viable alternative exists to the rights-restricting course of action it has taken.
1  
Scholars evaluate this general trend differently. Some hail it as the establishment of an 
epistemic community promoting a globalised rule of law through a converging elaboration of 
fundamental human rights norms. Others caution against judicial borrowings that tend to be 
unreflective, haphazard, self-serving, and insufficiently attentive to legal context and culture. To 
the bemusement – and amusement – of outside observers, some US jurists and scholars are 
locked in a peculiarly instrumental battle that pits exceptionalists against imperialists. The 
former abjure the importation of any foreign influence into US courtrooms that might corrupt 
American judicial reasoning. The latter counter that the capacity of the United States to exert 
influence around the world through the force of its jurisprudence is jeopardised by the 
diminishing regard by other courts for decisions by US courts. This, they believe, is driven by 
petulance at US courts’ lack of reciprocity. In other words, US courts should cite foreign 
judgments more often so that foreign courts will pay more attention to US jurisprudence.
2 
In the specific domain of counter-terrorism and national security, at least one additional 
incentive exists for the sharing of ideas between courts. Global networks of government actors 
are busy cooperating, collaborating, and exploiting opportunities for transnational coordination 
                                                      
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. The author warmly thanks Elspeth Guild, Mark Salter 
and Rayner Thwaites for insightful, incisive and constructive comments and suggestions. 
1 The literature on this topic is voluminous. See, generally, Christopher McCrudden (2000), “A Common 
Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights”, Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, 20, p. 499; René Provost (2008), “Judging in Splendid Isolation”, American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 56, p. 125; Ann-Marie Slaughter (2003), “A Global Community of Courts”, Harvard 
International Law Journal, 44, p. 191. 
2 For a popular summary of the US debate, see Adam Liptak (2008), “US Court, a Longtime Beacon, 
Now Guiding Fewer Nations”, New York Times, 18 September, A1. 2 | AUDREY MACKLIN 
 
through joint or coordinated military, intelligence, surveillance, transport, communication, 
financial and law enforcement activities. US legal scholar Ann-Marie Slaughter draws attention 
to the operation of these global governance networks post-9/11 as follows: 
Consider the examples simply in the wake of 11 September. The Bush administration 
immediately set about assembling an ‘ad hoc coalition’ of states to aid in the war on 
terrorism. Public attention focused on military cooperation, but the networks of 
financial regulators working to identify and freeze terrorist assets, of law enforcement 
officials sharing vital information on terrorist suspects, and of intelligence operatives 
working to pre-empt the next attack have been equally important. Indeed, the leading 
expert in the ‘new security’ of borders and container bombs insists that the domestic 
agencies responsible for customs, food safety and regulation of all kinds must extend 
their reach abroad, through reorganisation and much closer cooperation with their 
foreign counterparts. And after the US concluded that it did not have authority under 
international law to interdict a shipment of missiles from North Korea to Yemen, it 
turned to national law enforcement authorities to coordinate the extraterritorial 
enforcement of their national criminal laws. Networked threats require a networked 
response.
3 
One of most striking features of the post-9/11 legal environment is the mobilisation of 
international institutions in the service of bringing direct pressure to bear on states to adopt 
counter-terrorism policies, practices and laws. Beginning with Security Council Resolution 
1373 and radiating downwards through the United Nations bureaucracy and outwards to 
national and supranational bodies, evidence of Slaughter’s networked response appears 
abundant. However, if she is correct that global terrorism constitutes a “networked threat” 
requiring a “networked response” by states, perhaps states’ responses warrant “networked 
scrutiny” by courts. After all, extraordinary rendition, ghost prisons, and the exploitation of 
Guantánamo Bay’s anomalous legal status arguably illustrate the ugly and extralegal underside 
of inter-state cooperation and coordination.  
Beyond these specific uses of extraterritoriality, states have certainly looked to one another in 
devising mechanisms for dealing with security risks that deviate from human rights protections 
that have been more or less taken for granted in the criminal sphere for decades.  
In the face of these developments, international law scholar Eyal Benvenisti identifies an 
emerging “transnational coalition of national courts” that is actively resisting both the attempt 
by governments to constrain judicial authority to review the legality of executive action, and 
challenging the balance between liberty and security struck by governments through the various 
counter-terrorism measures. According to Benvenisti, national courts cross-reference policies 
and practices of other states against those of their own government, with a view to determining 
which measures are least restrictive of human rights. They also consult shared international 
norms (and interpretations of those norms) in their assessment of the legality of domestic law. 
Benvenisti advances the counterintuitive hypothesis that co-ordinated deployment of these 
strategies actually gives national courts more space and legitimacy to challenge executive 
action. In his view, a co-ordination of outcomes across jurisdictions provides a response to the 
claim that any individual national court risks turning their states into “a haven for terrorists” 
                                                      
3 Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004), “Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of 
Global Government Networks”, Government and Opposition, 39, pp. 159-190. See also Eyal Benvenisti 
(2008), “United We Stand: National Courts Reviewing Counterterrorism Measures”, in Andrea Bianchi 
and Alexis Keller (eds), Counterterrorism: Democracy’s Challenge, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 26-27 
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through its invalidation of a given law, and may also “thwart international pressure on their 
governments not to comply with the courts’ rulings”.
4 
The objective of this essay is to narrate an episodic exchange of communication between the 
Supreme Court of Canada and the European Court of Human Rights (with interventions by UK 
House of Lords) in relation to a central component of the domestic legal regime of dealing with 
non-citizens who allegedly pose a threat to national security. I do not contend that this episode 
is representative of how courts engage in comparative or international legal analysis in general 
or in the field of counter-terrorism in particular. However, I do argue that tracing the progress of 
this strand of counter-terrorism jurisprudence suggests that Benvenisti’s otherwise excellent 
account, while attractive and perhaps cogent as a general theory, makes two assumptions that 
seem unwarranted, at least in the context of Canada-EU dialogue. First, he supposes that courts 
accurately represent the practices of other states. Secondly, he presumes some consistent and 
principled rationale animating the choice to cite and engage with the practices or jurisprudence 
of other jurisdictions in this field. At the same time, Benvenisti’s explanation of the legitimating 
function of relying on another state’s practice may assist in understanding certain legal and 
policy outcomes.  
2. The  Stakes 
Reaction to the events of 9/11 quickly exposed states’ frustration with the apparent inadequacy 
of existing legal regimes in categorising and containing the emergent figure of the global 
terrorist. International humanitarian law was pressed into service through the rhetorical 
invocation of the ‘war on terror’; penal law was revised to define and criminalise terrorism; and 
migration law was deployed to repel the non-citizen terrorist by ejecting him from the territory.  
Yet each of these stratagems proved inadequate to the task assigned to it by political actors. The 
‘war on terror’ metaphor has been strained well beyond its breaking point, and the fiasco of 
Guantánamo Bay instantiates that collapse. The criminal law in common law jurisdictions veers 
dangerously toward the creation of a status offence – the existential crime of ‘being’ a terrorist. 
Still, the entrenched procedural and evidentiary protections available to the accused prove 
difficult to circumvent, even in the name of national security confidentiality. Thus, criminal 
prosecutions for terrorism are seldom pursued. Immigration law – the least versatile and least 
apt of these legal instruments – frequently emerges as the first and last resort of most states.  
Immigration law is least versatile because it applies only to non-citizens. Notably, the UK has 
attempted to finesse this limitation by amending nationality law to permit revocation of UK 
nationality from dual citizens in order to bring their legal status into alignment with the 
normative disavowal of the citizenship of so-called ‘home-grown’ terrorists.
5 These citizens 
thereby become the objects of exile, albeit under the formal guise of deportation.  
Migration law is least apt for resolving global terrorist threats because its remedy – transfer 
from the territory of one state to another – presumes the very parochialism that global terrorism 
ostensibly renders dangerously obsolete. That is not to deny that terrorism has a migration 
aspect, but rather to dispute the assumption that terrorism is a problem that migration law can 
solve. If terrorism indeed transcends borders, deportation merely displaces the problem, and 
may even enable its practitioners to advance their reprehensible agenda from elsewhere.  
                                                      
4 Benvenisti, “United We Stand”, p. 32.  
5 See Audrey Macklin, “The Securitization of Dual Citizenship” in Thomas Faist and Peter Kivisto, (eds.) 
Dual Citizenship in Global Perspective: From Unitary to Multiple Citizenship, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007, 46, at 60-61. 4 | AUDREY MACKLIN 
 
Given these apparent disadvantages, why the resort to migration regulation as the favoured 
response? As a branch of administrative law dealing with a literally disenfranchised group (non-
citizens), courts have historically permitted legislators to do to non-citizens under the rubric of 
immigration law what would have been unthinkable to an accused person under criminal law. 
Deportation is insistently characterised as something other (and lesser) than punishment; thus, 
the procedural, evidentiary and even carceral protections guaranteed under common law and 
constitutional law in the criminal context are denied or circumvented in immigration law. Put 
bluntly, the operating assumption of the state is that it is easier to deport than to prosecute. 
Immigration law thus emerges as the first resort of states looking to rid themselves of 
troublesome people who happen to be foreigners. 
One cannot but suspect a certain disingenuousness about what states of the global North really 
seek to achieve through deeming non-citizens as security risks for the purposes of deportation. 
Can it really be that in the post-9/11 climate, these states are indifferent as to what the state of 
citizenship does with or to a deportee who is handed over to authorities with the label ‘terrorist’ 
virtually stamped on his forehead? In principle, the consequences of expulsion consist of the 
following: the alleged terrorist walks free and unmolested by authorities of the receiving state; 
the person is arrested and tried according to law for some terrorism-related offence allegedly 
committed in the receiving state; or, he is taken into detention as a putative terrorist and – and 
what? Interrogated, tortured, detained indefinitely – or simply ‘disappeared’?  
3. The  Cases 
Four cases form the primary material for analysis: Chahal v. United Kingdom
6, Suresh v. 
Canada,
7 Saadi v. Italy
8 and Charkaoui v. Canada.
9 The timing of these cases in relation to 
world events is noteworthy: Chahal was argued and decided under the European Convention on 
the Promotion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) by the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1996. Suresh was argued before the Supreme Court of 
Canada in May 2001, but the judgment was released in January 2002. Charkaoui and Saadi date 
from 2007 and 2008 respectively.  
Although arising in different states, the context is roughly similar across jurisdictions: the 
executive identifies a non-citizen as a risk to national security. He is taken into detention where 
he remains, usually for years. An administrative process, sometimes subject to judicial 
supervision, reviews the determination of the executive according to a deferential standard 
and/or a standard of proof lower than that required for a criminal conviction. The ability of the 
person concerned to participate in the process, to know the case against him, to be represented 
by counsel, and to challenge the evidence against him, are each restricted on grounds of national 
security confidentiality. If the designation of the person as a risk to national security is upheld, 
he becomes deportable, at least in principle. At this point, Canadian and European jurisprudence 
diverge on the issue of whether deportation of a non-citizen to a place where he faces a 
substantial risk of torture always and necessarily violates fundamental human rights.  
In Canada, the foundational human rights instrument is the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. Although many other rights (equality, freedom from cruel and unusual treatment, 
right against arbitrary detention) are implicated, most of the jurisprudential heavy lifting with 
respect both to process and deportation is performed by section 7, which declares that “everyone 
                                                      
6 Chahal v. United Kingdom, (1996) 23 CHRR 413. 
7 Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 SCR 3. 
8 Saadi v. Italy, Application No. 37201/06, 28 February 2008 (Grand Chamber). 
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has the right to live, liberty and security of the person, and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with fundamental justice”. The European Convention deals with the 
procedural dimensions as potential infringements of the right against arbitrary detention (Article 
5(1) and 5(4)), while the decision to deport is analysed in terms of Article 3’s protection against 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
3.1  The process: national security confidentiality versus the right to 
know and respond to the case against you 
Karamjit Singh Chahal, originally from India, lived in the UK on an indefinite leave to remain. 
In 1985 and 1986, he was detained but released without charge under the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 1984 for his activities in connection with the International Sikh Youth Federation 
(ISYF). In 1986, he was convicted and served a nine-month prison sentence for assault charges 
arising out of a mêlée outside a Sikh temple in London.
10 On 16 August 1990, Chahal was taken 
into detention for purposes of deportation. The Home Secretary had decided that “his continued 
presence in the United Kingdom was inconducive to the public good for reasons of national 
security and other reasons of a political nature, namely the international fight against 
terrorism”.
11 The ordinary right of appeal against a deportation order was abrogated where the 
order is based on national security. Instead, the affected person could make oral or written 
representations to an independent, three-member, security-cleared quasi-judicial advisory panel 
composed of a High Court judge, a former president of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, and a 
person experienced in analysing intelligence. The Home Secretary had to disclose the evidence 
upon which he based his decision to the advisory panel, but retained sole authority to decide 
what evidence and sources would be disclosed to Chahal. Nor would Chahal be entitled to 
representation by legal counsel, or to know the the advisory panel’s non-binding 
recommendation to the Home Secretary regarding deportation. The Home Secretary affirmed 
his initial decision to deport Chahal, and advised Chahal that the Indian government had assured 
the Home Secretary that Chahal “would enjoy the same legal protection as any other Indian 
citizen, and that he would have no reason to expect to suffer mistreatment of any kind at the 
hands of the Indian authorities”.
12 
Judicial review by the High Court and the Court of Appeal were dismissed. Lord Justice 
Nolan’s ruling anticipates the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in Suresh by holding that: 
there may very well be occasions when the individual poses such a threat to this 
country and its inhabitants that considerations of his personal safety and well-being 
become virtually irrelevant. Nevertheless one would expect that the Secretary of State 
would balance the risks to this country against the risks to the individual, albeit that the 
scales might properly be weighted in favour of the former.
13 
The muted concern expressed by the English Court of Appeal about the weighing of national 
security against torture was voiced against a background of limited judicial authority to actually 
supervise the Home Secretary’s balancing exercise. The courts did not have access to the 
classified information upon which the Home Secretary made his decision. The English courts 
more or less conceded rather than contested this obstacle by admitting that judicial scrutiny 
                                                      
10 In 1992, those convictions were quashed by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). Chahal, para. 39. 
11 Chahal, para. 25. Chahal thereupon made an unsuccessful bid for asylum. 
12 Quoted in Chahal, para. 37. 
13 Quoted in Chahal, para. 41. 6 | AUDREY MACKLIN 
 
“may be defective or incomplete if all the relevant facts are not before the court”
14 but that, “in 
any event, the judicial process is unsuitable for reaching decisions on national security”.
15 
By the time the case reached the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Chahal had been in detention for about six years. The process by which he was determined to 
constitute a security threat (including his lengthy detention), and the decision to deport were 
each subject to scrutiny.  
The tension between protection of national security confidentiality and the right to know the 
case against you (audi alteram partem) was and remains a recurring feature of migration 
regimes across jurisdictions. A breach of procedural fairness strikes at the core of the rule of 
law’s commitment to fair trial. The ECtHR clearly struggled with the absence of disclosure to 
Chahal of the evidence supporting the terrorism allegations against him, while acknowledging 
both the exigencies of national security confidentiality and the ECtHR’s institutional 
responsibility to extend a margin of appreciation to individual states’ policy responses. 
The ECtHR turned to submissions made by a group of human rights NGO intervenors
16 about a 
Canadian process that, in principle, mediated the tension between confidentiality and disclosure 
in a preferable manner. Apparently basing their description on the intervenors’ submission, the 
ECtHR depicted the Canadian system in the following terms: 
Under the Canadian Immigration Act 1976 (as amended by the Immigration Act 1988), 
a Federal Court judge holds an in camera hearing of all the evidence, at which the 
applicant is provided with a statement summarising, as far as possible, the case against 
him or her and has the right to be represented and to call evidence. The confidentiality 
of security material is maintained by requiring such evidence to be examined in the 
absence of both the applicant and his or her representative. However, in these 
circumstances, their place is taken by a security-cleared counsel instructed by the court, 
who cross-examines the witnesses and generally assists the court to test the strength of 
the State's case. A summary of the evidence obtained by this procedure, with necessary 
deletions, is given to the applicant.
17 
This Canadian model offered the ECtHR something that, in the lexicon of Canadian 
constitutional jurisprudence, constituted a less restrictive alternative to the UK’s rights-
infringing practice: “This example illustrates that there are techniques which can be employed 
which both accommodate legitimate security concerns about the nature and sources of 
intelligence information and yet accord the individual a substantial measure of procedural 
justice”.
18 One can recognise in the ECtHR’s account of the Canadian practice a template for the 
Special Advocate model adopted by the United Kingdom in response to Chahal, as set out in the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997.
19 
                                                      
14 Quoted in Chahal, para. 41. 
15 These comments should be read against the more recent boldness of the House of Lords in applying the 
European Convention on Human Rights protections incorporated into UK law via the Human Rights Act. 
See, e.g. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, [2001] 3 W.L.R. 877; A. and others v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department: X & Anor v. Secretary of State for Home Department 
(Belmarsh 1) [2005] 2 AC 68 (House of Lords). 
16 Amnesty International, Liberty, the Advice on Individual Rights in Europe Centre and the Joint Council 
for the Rights of Immigrants.  
17 Chahal, para. 144. 
18 Chahal, para. 131. 
19 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (UK) 1997, c. 68. TRANSJUDICIAL CONVERSATIONS ABOUT SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS | 7 
 
This citation of the Canadian model as a factor in the Chahal decision, followed by the adoption 
of a similar approach by the UK might offer a salutary illustration of a transnational governance 
network with synergistic judicial and policy components, but for one detail: the Canadian model 
described in Chahal did not exist. No Federal Court judge ever performed the function ascribed 
to it by the ECtHR. Or, to be more accurate, the process that bore most similarity to what the 
ECtHR summarises was performed at the time by the Security Intelligence Review Committee 
(SIRC), a body tasked with overseeing the operation of the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS).
20 The SIRC was staffed by security-cleared Governor-in-Council appointees 
who were regarded as prominent individuals, at least some of whom had direct past experience 
in matters of security and intelligence.  
In the mid-1990s, if the Minister of Immigration and the Solicitor General of Canada formed the 
opinion based on intelligence and/or law enforcement data that a permanent resident (roughly 
equivalent to a non-citizen with ‘indefinite leave to remain’) posed a threat to national security, 
a report would be issued to SIRC. SIRC would then investigate the report and provide Cabinet 
with a reasoned conclusion about “whether or not a [security] certificate should be issued”. A 
security certificate declared an individual to be a threat to national security or public safety, 
operated as a non-appealable deportation order, and circumscribed the scope and capacity of the 
Federal Court to judicially review the legality of the deportation.
21 
The SIRC operated at arms-length from CSIS, which typically generated the information upon 
which the report was based. SIRC did possess statutory authority to access the information upon 
which the government relied in issuing its report, and to subpoena witnesses and documents. On 
its own initiative, SIRC devised an adversarial adjudication process for investigating and 
assessing the credibility of the report issued to it. A key feature of the process was the 
mechanism for ensuring that the evidence relied upon by government was subject to rigorous 
scrutiny and cross-examination, without thereby placing national security in jeopardy. The 
solution was to engage security-cleared SIRC counsel who, in effect, fulfilled some of the tasks 
that counsel for the affected party was precluded from performing because of national security 
confidentiality.
22 Much of the hearings before SIRC are conducted in camera and in the absence 
of the named person or his counsel. The role of SIRC counsel as not-quite-surrogate advocate 
for the affected party became salient in this context. 
One task for the SIRC counsel was to obtain as comprehensive a summary of the case as 
possible for the person concerned and his counsel. The natural predilection of CSIS (like all 
intelligence agencies) was to strenuously resist disclosure to the maximum extent. SIRC counsel 
                                                      
20 The following description of the SIRC in the period prior to 2002 is drawn from the following sources: 
Murray Rankin (1989-90), “The Security Intelligence Review Committee: Reconciling National Security 
with Procedural Fairness”, Canadian Journal of Administrative Law and Practice, 3, p. 173; Rayner 
Thwaites (2004), “Deportation on National Security Grounds Within a Culture of Justification”, LLM 
Thesis, University of Toronto, unpublished, Appendix 1; Craig Forcese & Lorne Waldman (2007), 
“Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand on 
the Use of Special Advocates in National Security Proceedings”, August, pp. 5-14 
(http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~cforcese/other/sastudy.pdf). 
21 Until 1988, the SIRC process was available to any non-citizen. After 1988 (and at the time Chahal was 
heard and decided), the SIRC review did not apply to non-citizens without permanent resident status. In 
those cases, the two Ministers would sign a security certificate deeming the person to constitute a danger 
to national security, and the certificate would go directly to review by a Federal Court judge without any 
prior scrutiny comparable to the SIRC process: 
22 SIRC employed in-house counsel, but where particularly aggressive cross-examination of government 
witnesses was deemed necessary, SIRC could engage outside counsel (with appropriate security 
clearance) to avoid any apprehension of bias on the part of SIRC toward CSIS. 8 | AUDREY MACKLIN 
 
would negotiate disclosure with CSIS from a position of expertise, and test CSIS to ensure that 
non-disclosure to the person concerned and his counsel in each instance was specifically 
justified and warranted. The SIRC Rules of Procedure (devised by SIRC) granted SIRC 
discretion “in balancing the requirements of preventing threats to the security of Canada and 
providing fairness to the person affected to determine if the facts of the case justify that the 
substance of the representations made by one party should be disclosed to one or more of the 
other parties.”
23 In practice, consultation with the CSIS director, combined with negotiation and 
the search for consensus on disclosure of information to the named person and his counsel seem 
to have permitted the attainment of a modus vivendi with respect to disclosure of information to 
the affected party and his counsel.
24 
The second critical function performed by SIRC counsel was to cross-examine CSIS and other 
government officials in the course of in camera hearings (where the person concerned and his 
counsel were excluded) in order to test the quality of the evidence against the named person. A 
former SIRC counsel advisor described his role as follows: 
The Committee’s counsel is instructed to cross-examine witnesses for the [Canadian 
Security Intelligence] Service with as much vigour as one would expect from the 
complainant’s counsel. Having been present during the unfolding of the complainant’s 
case, the Committee counsel is able to pursue the same line of questions. In addition, 
however, since Committee counsel has the requisite security clearance and has had the 
opportunity to review files not available to the complainant’s counsel, he or she is also 
able to explore issues and particulars that would be unknown to the complainant’s 
counsel.
25 
While SIRC counsel were emphatically not in a solicitor-client relationship with the named 
person, they could and did meet with that individual and his counsel before and after they were 
apprised of confidential, inculpatory information from the government. Obviously, SIRC 
counsel must be vigilant not to reveal (even inadvertently) any secret information. According to 
Forcese and Waldman, “[e]ven with this restriction, one of SIRC’s outside counsel told us that 
this questioning, done in an oblique manner to avoid involuntary disclosures of secret 
information, is central in unearthing potentially exculpatory information and observed that some 
cases at least have turned on information obtained from the named person in this manner.”
26  
This truncated summary suffices to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the portrait painted of the 
Canadian practice by the Chahal court. It also indicates the similarity between the SIRC 
committee process and the special advocate model ultimately introduced in the UK. However, 
Canada’s 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, passed in the wake of 9/11, abolished 
SIRC’s authority to review the designation of permanent residents as threats to national 
security. Instead, the Ministers could sign a security certificate, the named person would be 
detained, and the Federal Court would eventually review the security certificate on a standard of 
reasonableness. Non-citizens no longer had the benefit of the SIRC committee’s scrutiny of the 
government’s case, and were left only with the less scrupulous and more secretive Federal Court 
review. 
The Federal Court review virtually required the judge to conduct an in camera (secret) hearing 
in the absence of the named person or his counsel. The judge would authorise a summary of 
                                                      
23 SIRC, Rules of Procedure of the Security Intelligence Review Committee in Relation to its Function 
under Paragraph 38(C) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, para. 46(2)(a). 
24 Under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act,  
25 Rankin, supra note 20 at 184. 
26 Forcese & Waldman, supra note 20 at 9. TRANSJUDICIAL CONVERSATIONS ABOUT SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS | 9 
 
facts to be disclosed to the person named in the certificate, and that would be all the information 
available to the named person and his counsel. Without an analogue to SIRC counsel in the 
room, it fell to the Federal Court judge to test the quality of the evidence against the person 
named in the security certificate. Anecdotally, immigration lawyers familiar with both systems 
indicated that judges of the Federal Court were relatively inexpert and more deferential to the 
government in comparison to SIRC with respect to matters deemed subject to national security 
confidentiality. The summaries made available to the named person were, in practice, prepared 
by the government and approved by the judge, meaning that they contained only the information 
that the government wished to disclose.  
This was the legal scheme in effect at the time of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2007 
judgment in Charkaoui. By this point, the Supreme Court of Canada had already declared in 
Suresh that deportation to torture was generally prohibited under s. 7 of the Charter, except in 
unspecified exceptional circumstances. The process by which persons named in security 
certificates were detained without review, and the Federal Court’s review of the reasonableness 
of the security certificate itself, were subject to constitutional challenge. The Supreme Court of 
Canada judgment deflected consideration of the legislative and empirical reality that the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act permitted indefinite detention. The Supreme Court of 
Canada did confront other issues, including the breach of fundamental justice entailed by 
judicial review of the security certificate, wherein a Federal Court judge was authorised to rely 
upon evidence withheld from the named person which, in the opinion of the judge, was relevant 
but should not be disclosed because it might be injurious to national security or to the safety of 
any person. It was the sole responsibility of the judge to test the credibility of the secret 
evidence on his or her own, by putting questions to government counsel and witnesses. This 
task was wholly incongruous with the traditional role of the neutral and passive judge in the 
common law world, as Federal Court Justice Hugessen lamented in a speech excerpted in the 
Charkaoui judgment:  
We do not like this process of having to sit alone hearing only one part, and looking at 
the materials produced by only one party...  
If there is one thing that I learned in my practice at the Bar, and I have managed to 
retain it through all these years, it is that good cross-examination requires really careful 
preparation and a good knowledge of your case. And by definition, judges do not do 
that. ... we do not have any knowledge except what is given to us and when it is only 
given to us by one party we are not well suited to test the materials that are put before 
us.
27 
The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately validates the apprehensions of Justice Hugessen about 
the inadequacy of the existing scheme: 
Under IRPA’s certificate scheme, the named person may be deprived of access to or all 
of the information put against him or her, which would deny the person the ability to 
know the case to meet. Without this information, the named person may not be in a 
position to contradict errors, identify omissions, challenge the credibility of informants 
or refute false allegations. This problem is serious in itself. It also underlies the 
concerns, discussed above, about the independence and impartiality of the designated 
judge, and the ability of the judge to make a decision based on the facts and law … 
Ultimately, the judge may have to consider information that is not included in the 
summary [provided to the named person]. In the result, the judge may be required to 
decide the case, wholly or in part, on the basis of information that the named person 
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and his or her counsel never see. The named person may know nothing of the case to 
meet, and although technically afforded an opportunity to be heard, may be left in a 
position of having no idea as to what needs to be said.
28 
As in Chahal, the availability of less restrictive alternatives to the breach of fundamental justice 
entailed by the existing scheme played a significant role in leading the Supreme Court of 
Canada to the conclusion that the status quo was not “demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society”.
29 Justification requires that the objective sought by the rights infringement 
is “pressing and substantial” and the means of achieving it are proportional to the objective. The 
Supreme Court of Canada had little difficulty declaring that the “protection of Canada’s national 
security and related intelligence sources undoubtedly constitutes a pressing and substantial 
objective”.
30 Its attention turned quickly to surveying other less restrictive options, including the 
SIRC process described above that was restricted to permanent residents in 1988 and then 
abolished altogether in 2001. Notably, the Supreme Court of Canada’s account did not advert to 
the practice by SIRC counsel of meeting with and interviewing the person concerned before and 
after counsel viewed secret evidence.
31 The Supreme Court of Canada also cited the example of 
“special counsel” to the Commission of Inquiry in the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation 
to Maher Arar (Arar Inquiry).
32 According to the Supreme Court of Canada, the role of this 
special security-cleared counsel was to “act as amicus curiae on confidentiality applications” 
where the Commission was struggling to balance disclosure to the person concerned and to the 
public against national security confidentiality.
33 While technically accurate, the Supreme Court 
effectively overstated the very limited role of this security-cleared counsel, while failing to 
mention the far more important role played by general counsel to the Arar Commission, who 
acted rather more like SIRC counsel. That is to say, Arar Commission counsel were privy to 
information that was ultimately not disclosed to Mr. Arar or to other witnesses by reason of 
national security confidentiality, but nevertheless were able to meet with Arar, put questions to 
him, glean avenues of inquiry, and formulate bases upon which to test the government’s 
evidence, without divulging the content of the secret information. 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada refers to the UK Special Advocate model. The Court 
traces the influence of the mis-described Canadian process on the UK system, remarking that 
the European Court in Chahal was “perhaps referring to the procedure developed by SIRC”.
34 
Among the features of the UK Special Advocate model identified by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, particular attention is drawn to the provision prohibiting the special advocate from 
communicating with the person concerned after seeing the protected information, unless the 
special advocate seeks permission from the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), 
and the Secretary of State has an opportunity to object to the proposed communication before 
SIAC decides.
35 
                                                      
28 Charkaoui, at paras. 54-55. 
29 Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that the right and freedoms set out 
in the Charter are “subject to such reasonable limitations as are demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society”. 
30 Charkaoui, at para. 68. 
31 The Court’s account is at Charkaoui, at paras. 71-76. 
32 For critical reviews and analyses of the Arar Inquiry, see Audrey Macklin, Kent Roach, Reg Whitaker 
and Lindsay Aargard. 
33 Charkaoui, para. 79. 
34 Charkaoui, para. 80. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada cites the positive academic reception to the special advocate 
model, while noting that the system has also been subject to criticism for the barriers to 
communication with the person concerned or his counsel, the inability of special advocates to 
call witnesses, and the lack of resourcing.
36 Despite these apparent weaknesses, the Supreme 
Court of Canada concludes by invoking SIAC’s own favourable commentary on the 
contribution of special advocates to its own successful operation. It even chided the Canadian 
government for not explaining to the Court why the drafters of the impugned Canadian 
legislation “did not provide for special counsel . . . [as] is presently done in the United 
Kingdom.
37 Among the ‘less restrictive’ alternatives canvassed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the UK scheme impaired the rights of the person concerned more than the others, 
which were domestic and outside the courtroom context. Yet, I would suggest that a fair reading 
of the judgment conveys the impression that the Supreme Court of Canada was signalling its 
advance approbation not of the available option that impaired rights the least, but rather the 
most restrictive of those alternatives. This would seem to validate Benvenisti’s hypothesis that 
judges in one jurisdiction look for ‘political cover’ when striking down domestic legislation by 
pointing to less restrictive laws in another jurisdiction: if the Supreme Court of Canada 
endorsed existing UK practice, it could not be accused of making Canada a uniquely attractive 
haven for terrorists. However, the outcome also hints at the erosion of the principle that 
violations of rights be justified as the least restrictive possible.  
Presented with a declaration of unconstitutionality from the Supreme Court of Canada, plus a 
survey of less intrusive alternatives, the Canadian government ultimately and predictably 
responded by introducing legislation that more or less replicated the salient features of the UK 
special advocate model.  
By the time the Canadian special advocate legislation (Bill C-3) was introduced in mid-October 
2007, UK special advocate system had been ‘road tested’ more extensively and scrutinised more 
carefully against this experience. In July 2007, the UK House of Commons and House of Lords 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (Nineteenth Report) issued its latest report on, inter alia, the 
special advocate system. The Committee interviewed four special advocates about their 
experience. The Joint Committee described their evidence as “most disquieting”.
38 The major 
flaws identified by the special advocates were first, government resistance to full disclosure to 
the special advocate of the entire file (including both inculpatory and exculpatory information) 
and second, the practical inability of special advocates to consult and question the person 
concerned after the special advocate viewed the secret evidence.
39 Both of these constraints 
limited the ability of the person subject to a control order to know the case against him and to 
respond to it. The Joint Committee discussed at length the impediments that the existing regime 
erected to a fair hearing for the person named in control order.
40 It concluded as follows: 
After listening to the evidence of the Special Advocates, we found it hard not to reach 
for well worn descriptions of it as "Kafkaesque" or like the Star Chamber. The Special 
Advocates agreed when it was put to them that, in light of the concerns they had raised, 
"the public should be left in absolutely no doubt that what is happening … has 
absolutely nothing to do with the traditions of adversarial justice as we have come to 
                                                      
36 Charkaoui, para. 83. 
37 Charkaoui, para. 84. 
38 UK House of Commons and House of Lords Joint Committee on Human Rights, Nineteenth Report, 16 
July 2007, para. 192, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/jtrights/157/15709.htm. 
39 The low standard of proof applied by SIAC was also identified as a significant concern, though this is 
not distinctive to a special advocate model. 
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understand them in the British legal system." Indeed, we were left with the very strong 
feeling that this is a process which is not just offensive to the basic principles of 
adversarial justice in which lawyers are steeped, but it is very much against basic 
notions of fair play as the lay public would understand them.
41 
In light of the serious concerns harboured by the Joint Committee, their report urged that the 
UK government impose a clear and verifiable statutory obligation on the Secretary of State for 
the Home Department to “provide a statement of the gist of the closed material” and to permit 
the SIAC or a Court to balance the public interest in non-disclosure against the interests of 
justice in deciding whether material ought to be disclosed. The Joint Committee also 
recommended, subject to appropriate guidance and safeguards, “relaxation of the current 
prohibition on any communication between the special advocate and the person concerned or 
their legal representative after the special advocate has seen the closed material.” Ironically, the 
Joint Committee drew support for this latter proposal from the similar suggestion made in 
February 2007 (prior to the Supreme Court of Canada judgment in Charkaoui) by a Special 
Senate Committee of the Canadian Parliament on the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act.
42 
Despite the analysis, critique and recommendations regarding the special advocate system 
contained in the July 2007 Joint Committee Nineteenth Report, on 22 October 2007 the 
Canadian government introduced Bill C-3, An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act (certificates and special advocates). The legislation mimicked the salient features 
of the UK special advocate regime that had been excoriated by the Joint Committee. On 31 
October 2007, about a week after the first reading of Bill C-3 in the Canadian House of 
Commons, the UK House of Lords released Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB 
(FC).
43 The House of Lords upheld the control order regime against challenge under the Human 
Rights Act. Although the Law Lords managed to reiterate the erroneous depiction of the 
Canadian scheme as described in Chahal,
44 they also commented in their course of judgment on 
the potential deficiencies of the special advocate system in the UK. For instance, Lord Bingham 
of Cornwall specifically drew attention to the detrimental impact of the special advocate’s 
practical inability to consult with the person concerned after viewing the secret evidence:  
In any ordinary case, a client instructs his advocate what his defence is to the charges 
made against him, briefs the advocate on the weaknesses and vulnerability of the 
adverse witnesses, and indicates what evidence is available by way of rebuttal. This is 
a process which it may be impossible to adopt if the controlled person does not know 
the allegations made against him and cannot therefore give meaningful instructions, 
and the special advocate, once he knows what the allegations are, cannot tell the 
controlled person or seek instructions without permission, which in practice (as I 
understand) is not given. "Grave disadvantage" is not, I think, an exaggerated 
description of the controlled person's position where such circumstances obtain. 
…[T]he task of the court in any given case is to decide, looking at the process as a 
whole, whether a procedure has been used which involved significant injustice to the 
controlled person.
45 
                                                      
41 Joint Committee, Nineteenth Report, para. 210 
42 Fundamental Justice in Extraordinary Times: Main Report of the Special Senate Committee on the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, February 2007, at pp. 35-36 and 42. 
43 [2007] UKHL 46. 
44 See, e.g. para. 35 (per Lord Bingham), paras. 51-54 (per Lord Hoffman), para. 81 (per Lord Carswell).  
45 MB at para. 35. See also paras. 64-66 (per Baroness Hale: “I do not think that we can be confident that 
Strasbourg would hold that every control order hearing in which the special advocate procedure had been 
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Similarly, Baroness Hale identified the lack of disclosure and prohibition on communication as 
barriers to a fair process, and the need for vigilance in challenging the government’s tendency to 
over-claim the need for secrecy in terrorism-related cases: 
Both judge and special advocates will have stringently to test the material which 
remains closed. All must be alive to the possibility that material could be redacted or 
gisted in such a way as to enable the special advocates to seek the client's instructions 
upon it. All must be alive to the possibility that the special advocates be given leave to 
ask specific and carefully tailored questions of the client. Although not expressly 
provided for in [legislation], the special advocate should be able to call or have called 
witnesses to rebut the closed material.
46 
Notwithstanding the deficiencies in the actual operation of the special advocate model as 
described in the Joint Committee Nineteenth Report, and the reservations expressed by the 
House of Lords in MB, Canada’s Bill C-3 survived two more readings in Parliament, and 
review by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. 
It was passed into law without substantial amendment in February 2008.
47 Like its UK 
counterpart, it does not impose on the government a duty of full disclosure to the special 
advocate, and it severely impedes the ability of the special advocate to meet with the person 
named in the security certificate.
48 
To recap: In 1996, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in Chahal that the UK system for 
designating non-citizens as security threats violated basic rights to procedural fairness enshrined 
in the European Convention on Human Rights. In coming to this conclusion, the ECtHR 
commended as an alternative a Canadian model that did not exist and had never existed. The 
closest proxy was a process before an administrative body (SIRC) that exercised only a 
recommending function, and operated at a stage prior to the issuance a security certificate that 
was ultimately reviewable before the Federal Court. The Federal Court process was and 
remained intensely secretive, provided very little disclosure to the person named in the security 
certificate or his counsel, involved no special counsel, and effectively relied on the judge to test 
and assess the need for disclosure and the veracity of the government’s evidence.  
Following Chahal, the UK instituted a special advocate model predicated on the non-existent 
Canadian precedent. The UK model was arguably inferior to the actually existing SIRC process, 
but in 2001, that SIRC process was abolished anyway, leaving only the Federal Court review. In 
2006, that Federal Court review of security certificates was successfully challenged. The 
Supreme Court of Canada struck it down as a violation of fundamental justice under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for many of the same reasons that the UK process 
was found wanting a decade earlier in the Chahal decision. In the course of coming to their 
conclusion, the Supreme Court of Canada commended as an alternative the UK special advocate 
model.  
                                                                                                                                                            
elsewhere of a tendency to over-claim the need for secrecy in terrorism cases … All must be alive to the 
possibility that the special advocates be given leave to ask specific and carefully tailored questions of the 
client. Although not expressly provided for in [the special advocate legislation], the special advocate 
should be able to call or have called witnesses to rebut the closed material. The nature of the case may be 
such that the client does not need to know all the details of the evidence in order to make an effective 
challenge”.) The MB case was heard just prior to the release of the Joint Committee Nineteenth Report. 
46 MB at para. 66. 
47 The legislation was incorporated into the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001, c. 27, ss. 76-
87.2 
48 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s. 85.4 14 | AUDREY MACKLIN 
 
Meanwhile, that UK special advocate process was coming under severe criticism by the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, and the House of Lords subsequently expressed similar, though 
more muted, reservations about it. Nevertheless, the Canadian government’s response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Charkaoui was to adopt the UK model. And that is what Canada 
has today: a special advocate scheme that mimics a deficient UK model that is itself a copy of a 
non-existent Canadian precedent. One might describe this outcome as the production of a 
jurisprudential simulacrum: the manufacture of a real copy of a fictitious original.  
3.2  The substance: deportation to torture 
The conversation between the European Court of Human Rights, Canada and, to an extent, the 
UK House of Lords about the process might best be characterised as a transatlantic recirculation 
of misinformation. The substantive issue that travels along with the procedural one is, of course, 
the legality of deporting a non-citizen designated a security risk to a country where he faces a 
substantial risk of torture. Given that the prohibition on deportation to torture is explicitly and 
categorically prohibited under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, one 
might have expected reliance on this common text to signal, in Benvenisti’s words, a judicial 
“readiness to cooperate”, and insurance against “the future retreat of one of [the national courts] 
from the shared interpretation”.
49 Yet despite international and comparative allies, the Supreme 
Court of Canada was manifestly unwilling to play on the team. 
The European Court of Human Rights first confronted this question in Chahal in 1996, 
concluding that Article 3 of the European Convention’s absolute prohibition on torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment encompassed deportation by a state party to a 
non-state party where the person faced a substantial risk of torture. Although Article 3 of the 
European Convention does not expressly address deportation, the ECtHR interpreted in 
conformity with the CAT provision. In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh addressed 
the same issue. The unanimous judgment affirmed that Canada is a party to the Convention 
Against Torture (CAT), and that Article 3 of CAT categorically prohibits deportation to torture, 
the Supreme Court unaccountably drew the inference that international law merely counselled 
but did not mandate a congruent interpretation of section 7 of the Charter: “This suggests that, 
barring extraordinary circumstances, deportation to torture will generally violate the principles 
of fundamental justice protected by s. 7 of the Charter” (emphasis added).
50 The Supreme Court 
offers neither a jurisprudential nor normative basis in international law or, for that matter, in 
Canadian constitutional law, for these qualifications on the absolute prohibition on deportation 
to torture.
51  
The Court does quote approvingly from the judgments of Lords Steyn and Hoffman in Re 
Rehman, in which the Law Lords indicate that a decision to deport must be done on a case-by-
case basis, taking into account the prejudice to national security and the likely consequences of 
deportation to the person concerned.
52 While these quotes might appear to endorse a case-by-
                                                      
49 Eyal Benvenisti (2008), “Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law 
by National Courts”, American Journal of International Law, 102, p. 18 (http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1007453). Benvenisti acknowledges that implementation of a shared international norm in the domestic 
arena is not unproblematic, but also admits that court can also draw on a medley of tactics to overcome 
the hurdles if they so choose. 
50 Suresh, para. 76. 
51 See, further, Rayner Thwaites, in Canada-EU Security Relations: The Other Transatlantic Mark B. 
Salter ed. forthcoming.,   
52 Suresh, para. 77, quoting Rehman, per Lord Hoffman, at para. 56 and Lord Slynn of Hadley, at para. 
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case balancing of national security against torture, Lord Hoffman makes it amply clear 
elsewhere in his judgment (in a passage not quoted by the Supreme Court of Canada) that he 
considers the UK bound by the ruling in Chahal: 
The European jurisprudence makes it clear that whether deportation is in the interests 
of national security is irrelevant to rights under article 3. If there is a danger of torture, 
the Government must find some other way of dealing with a threat to national security. 
Whether a sufficient risk exists is a question of evaluation and prediction based on 
evidence. In answering such a question, the executive enjoys no constitutional 
prerogative.
53 
Although the Supreme Court of Canada does not misquote the Law Lords in a manner 
comparable to the way in which the European Court of Human Rights in Chahal misrepresented 
the Canadian system, it is arguable that the Supreme Court in Suresh engaged in precisely the 
sort of tactical ‘cherry picking’ that critics of judicial comparativism deplore. To the extent that 
it uses selective quotations from the Law Lords to insinuate that the Supreme Court of Canada 
is not alone among its judicial colleagues in other democracies in balancing national security 
against torture, the Supreme Court communicates a message that can most charitably be 
described as ambiguous.  
The Supreme Court also declined to elaborate on what might constitute exceptional 
circumstances. The government of Canada, however, has subsequently argued that exceptional 
circumstances obtain in each security certificate case involving potential deportation to a 
country that routinely engages in torture.
54 
Several EU member state governments, along with the Canadian government have devoted 
considerable energy to securing diplomatic assurances from countries that engage in torture that 
these same states will not torture the particular individual who is the subject of the assurance. 
The objective is to reduce the risk of torture from ‘substantial’ to some lesser, legally 
acceptable, likelihood of torture. For EU governments, this would enable member states to 
deport non-citizen security risks without breaching Article 3 of the European Convention. For 
the Canadian government, diplomatic assurances offer an alternative justification for 
deportation, alongside the assertion of ‘exceptional circumstances’ warranting return to torture.  
In the wake of the Suresh decision, several European governments seized the opportunity 
presented by the Supreme Court of Canada to insist that Chahal ought to be reconsidered in 
light of the ‘new reality’ of the post-9/11 world. These states contended that the European Court 
of Human Rights ought to abandon its absolutist position and adopt the balancing approach of 
the Supreme Court of Canada, whereby the danger to national security posed by the presence of 
the non-citizen would be balanced against the harm of torture to that person if deported. 
Between 2006 and 2007, several states petitioned the European Court of Human Rights to 
revisit Chahal, and human rights organisations intervened in opposition. The parties and the 
interveners were clearly aware of Suresh, and included reference to the judgment in their 
submissions in Ramzy…. The Court ultimately replied with its decision in Saadi v. Italy, in 
which it emphatically upheld the absolute prohibition under Article 3 on return to torture, and 
amplified its scepticism about the reliability of diplomatic assurances.  
The legality of deporting a person to face a substantial risk of torture presents itself as an 
unalloyed normative question. The answer does not depend on empirical data or the weighing of 
evidence: one may assume that the non-citizen constitutes a danger to national security and that 
the risk of torture is substantial. Unlike the process questions discussed above, it does not 
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engage problems of institutional design or selection from a range of policy choices. Nor does it 
seem affected by the particularities of embedded political, institutional or legal cultures. Indeed, 
since all European Union member states as well as Canada are bound by the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture, which absolutely prohibits deportation to torture, there exists an 
even greater opportunity for judicial dialogue organised around a common norm. As such, the 
legality of deportation to torture would seem better-suited than the procedural issues – if not 
ideally suited – to a comparative engagement with ideas and argumentation across jurisdictions. 
Historical and contemporary precedent invites situating the deportation of security threats 
somewhere between two existing and illicit state practices, namely disguised extradition and 
rendition. Deportation of alleged terrorists cannot be assimilated to either, but shares certain 
features in common with both. Disguised extradition is a familiar and long-standing device used 
by states to dispatch non-citizens who are suspected of crimes abroad to a country with which 
the sending state does not have an extradition treaty, and/or whose justice systems would not 
withstand even the limited judicial review that is usually required as a precondition to 
extraditing a fugitive. Extraordinary rendition is the notorious post-9/11 United States practice 
of illegally, forcibly and extrajudicially transporting individuals suspected of terrorist links to 
states where the detainees will likely be subject to interrogation through cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or torture.  
In many instances where states seek to deport alleged terrorist threats, the human rights record 
of the receiving country is infamous for documented practices of abuse and denial of basic 
human rights, including cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or torture, thereby making the link 
between deportation and rendition.  
In some cases, conduct in the country of citizenship is at least one factor leading to the 
identification of a non-citizen as a security threat, making the analogy to disguised extradition 
relevant. This was the case in Saadi, a Tunisian national living in Italy who was tried in Italy for 
conspiracy to commit acts of terror-related violence, but also tried, convicted and sentenced in 
absentia to 20 years imprisonment by a Tunisian military court “for membership of a terrorist 
organisation acting abroad in peacetime and for incitement to terrorism”. Tunisia, however, did 
not seek to extradite Saadi.  
Two significant differences between rendition and deportation of security risks warrant a 
mention. First, in Canada and the European Union, deportation of security risks follows some 
type of legal procedure and in that sense is not extrajudicial. Secondly, rendition to torture is 
occasionally rationalised by resort to the specious claim that interrogation under conditions of 
brutality will yield the disclosure of vital information that will somehow aid in the ‘war on 
terror’ and save innocent lives. Without in any way validating this pernicious and untenable 
claim, it is worth noting that those who defend the deportation of alleged security threats to face 
a substantial risk of torture do not even purport to instrumentalise the possible torture of the 
deportee. Sending states are not looking to extract more information from the person concerned 
by delivering him to torture. They just want to dispose of him. They cannot claim that no 
alternative to deportation exists. After all, solutions must be found for citizens who pose the 
same level of risk, because they cannot be exiled (unless – perhaps – they hold citizenship 
elsewhere). Whatever weight one attaches to ‘diplomatic assurances’ from the receiving state 
that the deportee will not be tortured, it is indisputable that the risk of torture under these 
circumstances exceeds the risk of torture if the person is not deported at all.
55 
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Put simply, the rationale for deportation to face a risk of torture rests on the tacit claim that state 
sovereignty resides in the absolute right to exclude the non-citizen.
56 This commitment to 
sovereignty as the power to exclude is remarkably intransigent and resilient, and in certain 
respects has survived the remarkable lowering of borders for citizens of member states of the 
European Union.
57 It should not be overlooked that the deferral of the power to exclude from the 
national to the supranational level represents a contractual agreement between sovereign states, 
not an agreement between individuals and states, nor a recognition of an individual human right. 
The right of a state to exclude the non-citizen remains, but the citizen has been redefined as a 
third-country national, or a non-EU citizen. 
From this statist perspective, the vindication of the sovereign right to exclude the non-EU 
citizen demands the subordination of the human right to be free from torture. Once one 
concedes that similarly risky citizens cannot be exiled, there is nothing on the other side of the 
balance capable of outweighing the harm of torture, except the brute fact of non-citizenship. In 
this sense, what is ultimately at stake in the debate around the deportability of non-citizens 
alleged under immigration law to constitute threats to national security is ultimately the equality 
of non-citizens qua human. Indeed, the House of Lords judgment in A (FC) and others (FC) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (The Belmarsh Case) brilliantly lays bare the 
iniquity of discrimination on the basis of citizenship for purposes of indefinite detention.
58 
Perhaps because the unconditional right to enter and remain is the distinguishing entitlement of 
citizens, and the absolute right of states to expel non-citizens stands as its putative obverse, 
courts have tended to avoid confronting the existential and moral inequality of non-citizens that 
subvenes an executive-driven (as opposed to criminal) process for designating a non-citizen a 
risk to national security for purposes of deporting him to a country where he may face a risk of 
torture.  
What is stunning about the conflicting judgments from the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh 
and the European Court of Human Rights in Chahal and Saadi concerning deportation to torture 
is not what each court says about the other, but rather what the courts do not say. They do not 
say anything. Suresh does not refer to Chahal. Saadi does not refer to Suresh.  
It is inconceivable that either court was unaware to the decision of the other. The Supreme 
Court of Canada in Suresh does cite Article 3 of the European Convention when listing the 
many multilateral instruments prohibiting torture. The European Court of Human Rights in 
Saadi re-considers (and rejects again) the notion of a balancing test that is central to the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Suresh. Yet neither court is willing to explicitly engage 
with the other’s reasoning qua judgment of another court.  
With respect to deportation to torture, the ECtHR in Saadi simply reaffirmed its judgment in 
Chahal: 
Since protection against the treatment prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that provision 
imposes an obligation not to extradite or expel any person who, in the receiving 
country, would run the real risk of being subjected to such treatment. As the Court has 
repeatedly held, there can be no derogation from that rule …. It must therefore reaffirm 
the principle stated in the Chahal judgment that it is not possible to weigh the risk of 
ill-treatment against the reasons put forward for the expulsion in order to determine 
                                                      
56 Cf. Rayner Thwaites, supra note 51. 
57 The apparent encroachments on this principle, whether in the form of the refugee protection or family 
unity, are notable for the policy backlashes in the form of heightened restrictions on initial access to 
territory. 
58 [2004] UKHL 56. See, e.g. paras. 45-73, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill.  18 | AUDREY MACKLIN 
 
whether the responsibility of a State is engaged under Article 3, even where such 
treatment is inflicted by another State. In that connection, the conduct of the person 
concerned, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into account….
59.  
The sharpest rebuke of the position advanced by the governments (especially that of the UK as 
intervener), came from the concurring opinion of Judge Zupančič. His remarks chime with the 
anti-discrimination rationale propounded by the UK House Lords in Belmarsh, and indirectly 
expose the unarticulated conception of the non-citizen that underwrites the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s willingness to countenance (even hypothetically) his delivery to torture. Judge 
Zupančič states that the only way to avoid the logical necessity flowing from the “categorical 
imperative protecting the rights of the individual” would be “to maintain that such individuals 
do not deserve human rights … because they are less human”.
60 
4. Conclusion 
What lessons might one draw from this reading of European and Canadian judgments? The 
errors of commission manifested by the distorted portrayal of the Canadian process for 
designating non-citizens as security threats seem matched by the errors of omission arising from 
the refusal of the Supreme Court of Canada and the European Court of Human Rights to engage 
one another on the issue of deportation to torture. In the first instance, one can trace the tangible 
effects of the misrepresentation on the evolution of policy outcomes: the endorsement by one 
court of another state’s practice as a less restrictive alternative to the status quo becomes the 
minimum benchmark for subsequent policy. 
Providing an accurate description of the practice in question seems like a relatively 
undemanding standard for courts to meet, insofar as it does not call for a translation across legal 
orders of a distinct and internally complex matrix of doctrine or jurisprudence. In the second 
instance, one might simply observe that when courts decline to engage with the reasoning of 
other courts on normative questions that are eminently portable across jurisdictions, one cannot 
but question the authenticity of a commitment to the project of transnational judicial 
cooperation, and the motivation that animates any particular comparative exercise. Perhaps 
courts are content to borrow analyses that arrive at the same destination the court is already 
heading towards, but precluded by a certain judicial courtesy from openly engaging with and 
criticising oppositional reasoning of other courts. In other words, maybe courts have elevated to 
an informal rule of judicial interaction that familiar admonition of mothers around the world: “if 
you can’t say anything nice, don’t say anything at all.”
61 While this may be a fine and 
honourable adage for guiding daily conduct, it poses the obvious hazard of warping and 
truncating any meaningful comparative exercise.  
                                                      
59 Chahal, para. 80. 
60 Saadi, para. 2. 
61 The UK House of Lords clearly wrestled with this in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
ex parte Adam & Aitseguer, [2001] 1 All ER 593. At issue were conflicting interpretations of the United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in relation to non-state actors as agents of 
persecution. While the House of Lords was evidently reluctant to criticise the restrictive interpretations 
adopted by French and German courts at the time, Lord Steyn (along with Lord Hobhouse) finally 
declared in rather bald terms that “there can only be one true meaning” of an international treaty. The 
Law Lords’ interpretation was correct, and the German and French courts were wrong. In a subsequent 
decision, however, the House of Lords were at pains to minimise the practical impact of conflicting 
interpretations on the fate of the individual asylum seeker before them. Regina v Secretary of State for 
The Home Department, ex parte Thangarasa & Yogathas, [2002] UKHL 36.   TRANSJUDICIAL CONVERSATIONS ABOUT SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS | 19 
 
Is there something specific about the national security context that explains the disquieting 
features of the cases examined here? Are courts more careful, or nuanced, or principled when 
making forays into comparative analysis in other domains of law? While my intuition inclines 
me toward scepticism, a proper answer requires further inquiry. More specifically, it requires 
accurate and principled comparative research.  
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